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Abstract: Privacy policies are the main way to obtain information related to personal data
collection and processing. Originally, privacy policies were presented as textual documents. How-
ever, the unsuitability of this format for the needs of today’s society gave birth to other means
of expression. In this paper, we systematically study the different means of expression of privacy
policies. In doing so, we have explored the three main categories, which we call facets, i.e., natural
language, graphical and machine-readable privacy policies. Each of these facets focuses on the
particular needs of the communities they come from, i.e., law experts, organizations and privacy
advocates, and academics, respectively. We then analyze the benefits and limitations of each facet,
and explain why solutions based on a single facet do not cover the needs of other communities.
Finally, we set guidelines and discuss challenges of an approach to expressing privacy policies which
brings together the benefits of each facet as an attempt to overcome their limitations.
Key-words: privacy policies, legal compliance, usability, enforcement
SoK : Trois facettes des politiques de protection de vie
prive´e
Re´sume´ : Les politiques de protection de vie prive´e sont le principal moyen d’obtenir de
l’information lie´e a` la collecte et au traitement de donne´es a` caracte`re personnel. Ces politiques
e´taient originellement pre´sente´es comme des documents textuels. Cependant, la non-convenance
de ce format aux besoins de la socie´te´ actuelle a donne´ lieu a` d’autres moyens d’expression.
Dans ce rapport, nous e´tudions de manie`re syste´matique les diffe´rents moyens d’expression des
politiques de protection de vie prive´e. Ce faisant, nous identifions trois cate´gories principales que
nous nommons dimensions, i.e., les politiques en langage naturel, la repre´sentation graphique des
politiques, et les politiques lisibles par les machines. Chacune de ses dimensions se concentre sur
les besoins spe´cifiques de la communaute´ dont elle est issue, i.e., respectivement les juristes, les
organisations et les de´fenseurs de la vie prive´e, et les universitaires. Nous analysons ensuite les
avantages et les limites de chaque dimension, et nous expliquons en quoi les solutions base´es sur
une seule dimension ne couvrent pas les besoins des autres communaute´s. Enfin, nous proposons
une nouvelle approche pour exprimer les politiques de protection de vie prive´e qui re´unit les
avantages de chaque dimension, dans le but de surmonter leurs limites.
Mots-cle´s : politiques de vie prive´e, conformite´ le´gale, utilisabilite´, mise en application
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1 Introduction
As of today, the main way to obtain information related to personal data collection and pro-
cessing is through privacy policies. Privacy policies are typically presented as textual documents
describing details such as data collection, processing, disclosure and management. Organizations
collecting personal data (in what follows data controllers, or DC) commonly use privacy policies
to inform individuals (in what follows data subjects, or DS) about how personal data is handled.
DS are often required to read these policies — even though it rarely occurs [57] — or are at least
presumed to do so and to decide whether they accept the conditions. Alternatively, giving DS
the possibility of describing their own privacy policies has recently gained in popularity. This
approach gives DS the time to reflect on their choices, and the possibility to consult experts and
pairs. Nonetheless, privacy policies are hard to understand [21], for DS [68] as for experts [89].
We use DS policies to refer to the privacy policies of individuals, and DC policies to denote the
privacy policies of organizations collecting personal data.
Requirements and recommendations to express privacy policies come from different sources
such as privacy regulations, authorities and organizations. For instance, in Europe, the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [39] requires more transparency for data processing from
DC, and guidelines have been issued by the WP291 to present their expectations [111]. These
requirements are necessary for privacy policies to be compliant with the legislation. Recom-
mendations for drafting policies have also been made by different organizations to improve their
readability. For example, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration for
mobile apps [72], and the WP29 for IoT devices [110]. Furthermore, Data Protection Authorities
(DPAs) should be able to audit data processing systems, to ensure their compliance with the
law and with the declared privacy policies.2 All these requirements and recommendations can
be summarized in three requirements:
• Privacy policies must be legally valid.
• Privacy policies must be understandable by all parties.
• Privacy policies must be enforceable and auditable in data processing systems.
Existing methods to express privacy policies address some of these requirements, but not all
of them. Different methods have arisen from different needs, and they target different audiences
— from expert to lay-users. For instance, legal privacy policies are often written as long and
complex documents which are necessary in court, but that are not easy to understand for lay-
users. As an attempt to simplify these legal documents, organizations work on summarized
versions of privacy policies or use visual aids to help users understand the risks of having their
data collected. Ensuring that data is processed according to the requirements in privacy policies
is not an easy task either. Some work — coming mostly from academia — proposes an alternative
format for privacy policies that can be read by computers. These solutions aim at bridging the
gap between the textual legal requirements and their enforcement in the underlying system.
Furthermore, some of these proposals are equipped with auditing tools which facilitate, for
DPAs or DS, verifying that no violations of a privacy policy have occurred. Unfortunately, these
solutions are not widely used.
In this work, we analyze the state-of-the-art methods on expressing privacy policies. We
provide a comprehensive picture of existing proposals in order to identify gaps and challenges.
1WP29 stands for Working Party 29, an European advisory board.
2For instance, see the decision of the “Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Liberte´s” (CNIL), the
French DPA, against Google LLC [25].
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In doing so, we have studied the three main ways to express privacy policies: natural lan-
guage, graphical and machine-readable; which we call the facets of privacy policies. Each of
these facets have mostly arisen from different communities. Natural language comes from law
experts, graphical from organizations and privacy advocates, and machine-readable from aca-
demics. Consequently, the content of this paper contextualizes knowledge often studied within
different communities that have been working on similar issues, but with different objectives.
Unsurprisingly, each facet mainly provides benefits to the specific community it was defined in.
Therefore, we take the insights of our study to explore how the different facets of privacy policies
can complement each other. This synergy includes the benefits of each facet and minimize their
limitations. We discuss guidelines and challenges of combining all facets in a single policy, which
we denoted as multi-faceted privacy policies, and study recent efforts in this direction.
More concretely, in bringing the above ideas to the forefront, our contributions are:
1. A categorization of existing work in each facet according to a privacy taxonomy (introduced
in Section 2), and the specific features of each facet.
2. An in-depth study of the existing facets of privacy policies: i) privacy policies expressed
in natural language (Section 3), ii) graphical privacy policies (Section 4), and iii) machine-
readable privacy policies (Section 5). For each facet, we provide an overview of: its content;
the available tools; its benefits; and its limitations.
3. Insights from the study on future research on designing privacy policies (Section 6).
Section 7 discusses related work and concludes the paper.
2 Systematization Methodology
For each facet, we study the content of the privacy policies, the available tools, benefits and
limitations. The literature of privacy policies across the different facets is vast. An exhaustive
analysis of all works is unfeasible and undesirable. Instead, we focus on highlighting representa-
tive work; hence we do not provide an all-encompassing reference to every related work.
We categorize the content in each facet according to a taxonomy of privacy policies. Several
taxonomies have been proposed to categorize the content of privacy policies [96, 109, 77]. We
use a slight variation of [109]. This taxonomy is appropriate for our purposes for two main
reasons: 1) it was devised for a wide range of privacy policies and therefore reflects their content
across facets; and 2) it encompasses most requirements of the current legislations and guidelines,
such as the GDPR, the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) [40] in some cases, and the
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) [97].
Taxonomy
Wilson et al. [109] proposed a taxonomy for privacy policies composed of the following items:3
“First Party collection: How and why a service provider collects user information”, “Third Party
collection: How user information may be shared with or collected by third parties”, “Access, Edit,
Delete: If and how users may access, edit, or delete their information”, “Data Retention: How
long user information is stored”, “Data Security : How user information is protected”, “Specific
Audiences: Practices that pertain only to a specific group of users (e.g., children, Europeans,
or California residents)”, “Do-Not-Track : If and how Do Not Track signals for online tracking
and advertising are honored”, “Policy Change: If and how users will be informed about changes
3We denote item a piece of information provided in a privacy policy.
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to the privacy policy”, “Other : Additional sub-labels for introductory or general text, contact
information, and practices not covered by the other categories”, and “Choice Control : Choices
and control options available to users”.
Our variation of Wilson et al.’s taxonomy accommodates it to the purposes of our study, but
does not change the content. Concretely: i) we use DS rights to denote Access, Edit, Delete and
Choice Control as they relate to DS rights in the sense of the GDPR (see Chapter III of the
GDPR); ii) subsume Specific Audiences and Do-Not-Track under Other as they are occasional
items; and iii) we observe that a legal requirement is missing in the taxonomy, even though it is
often found in natural language privacy policies: the legal basis of processing, we will therefore
add it to our taxonomy. These differences better accommodate recent regulations (for DS rights
and Legal basis) and practices (for Other). Table 1 summarizes the taxonomy. Section 3.1
provides a detailed explanation of each taxonomy item together with illustrative examples.
Taxonomy item Description GDPR FIPPs CCPA HIPAAa COPPAb
First Party
collection
Type of data collected, purpose and collection
mode.
  G#   
Third Party
collection
Type of data collected, purpose and collection
mode for third parties.
  G# G#  
Legal basis Ground on which is determined the lawfulness
of processing.
 G# # # #
DS rights Rights of the DS, e.g., right to access, to rec-
tify, to port or erasure.
 # G#   
Data Reten-
tion
Duration of data storage  # # # G#
Data Security Modalities of protection of data, e.g., en-
crypted communication and storage.
G#  #  G#
Policy Change Modalities of notification for policy changes. G# # # # #
Other Other items such as identity of DC, informa-
tion related to Do-Not-Track, to children . . .
 / G#  / G#  / # G#  
Table 1: Summary of our taxonomy with the legal requirements of items. We use  to denote
Required explicitly ; G# to denote Addressed but not required ; and # to denote Absent. The
subscript a means that HIPAA only considers health data. The subscript b means that COPPA
only considers personal information from children, and notice must be addressed to parents.
3 Natural language privacy policies
Most legislations require notices expressed in natural language to inform DS about the collection
and processing of their personal data: the use of natural language is necessary to ensure that the
policy has legal value (e.g., [39, Art. 13 & 14]). The ways these documents can be authored —
i.e., drafted automatically or written manually — and the manners to assist their authoring can
vary greatly. We present the content expressed by natural language privacy policies in Section
3.1, the tools used to assist their authoring and to analyze existing natural language privacy
policies in Section 3.2, the benefits in Section 3.3, and the limitations in Section 3.4.
3.1 Content
Natural language privacy policies are familiar to the public as they have been adopted by a
large range of online services such as social networks, file hosting services, mobile applications,
etc. Because these privacy policies are expressed in natural language, they are not restricted in
terms of content; they cover all the items of our taxonomy (see Section 2). In the following we
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examine the taxonomy items in detail, and discuss what legal requirements appear explicitly in
the GDPR, the FIPPs, or in the CCPA.
We focus on the requirements of the GDPR, the FIPPs, and the CCPA as they are the three
main texts (legislations or guidelines) that determine the content required when informing DS
of data collection and processing. The GDPR is the text regulating personal data collection
and processing in the EU, and many countries consider it since it has an extraterritorial scope.
The FIPPs are guidelines designed by the United States Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC).
They represent common principles regarding fair information practices. However, they have
been criticised by scholars [22], and have not been updated in decades. The CCPA is more
recent (2018), it is a privacy enhancing and consumer protection bill for Californians. It has
been deemed “the strongest privacy controls of any state in the U.S” [2]. We also consider other
widely-known regulations, such as health data for HIPAA [104, Notice and Other Individual
Rights], or children for COPPA [41, Aˆ§ 312.4]).
First Party Collection The most common item in natural language privacy policies is the
first party collection, which describes what data is collected, why it is collected, and sometimes
how. The type of data ranges from generic to more precise assertions, e.g., respectively we collect
your data and your email address is collected. Cookies [31] often have a distinct treatment, most
likely because they are often collected by websites: it is common to find a dedicated paragraph
for their management. Location information is often treated in a separate section as well because
it can be collected from different sources — mobile applications, web browsers — or inferred from
metadata — such as IP addresses. The purpose of processing often goes hand in hand with the
type of data collected. It is also possible to find the collection mode in some natural language
privacy policies: whether the data is collected automatically, by manual input of DS, or by any
other means.
Informing about the type of data, the purpose of processing, the recipients and the means of
collection is required by the GDPR and the FIPPs. The CCPA gives the right to request first
party collection, but does not require it. HIPAA requires to inform of “the ways in which the
covered entity may use and disclose protected health information”. COPPA requires to inform
of “what use, if any, the operator will make of the personal information collected”.
Third Party Collection Third Party Collection is a common item in natural language privacy
policies, and it is therefore usual to find the third-parties to whom data will be transferred: they
can be advertisers, or other business partners. The notion of sharing can also refer to other DS
and subsidiary companies. It is usually composed of the same content as First Party Collection.
Informing about third party collection is required by both the GDPR, the FIPPs, and
COPPA. The CCPA gives the right to request categories of third parties, but does not require
it except if data is sold to those third parties. HIPPA considers it implicitly (see [104, Who is
Covered by the Privacy Rule]).
Legal basis Legal basis (or legal ground) is regularly found as a complement of the purpose
of processing. 4 A common legal basis for processing is consent, which consists, for DC, in
retrieving an authorization from DS to legally collect their data. Consent has to be informed
and specific under the GDPR [39, Recital 32], and it still is often used as a legal basis. DC might
consider the reading of their natural language privacy policies as a proper consent, without
questioning the conditions to obtain consent [43]. Other legal basis can be found in natural
4Art. 13(1)(c) of the GDPR requires ”The purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended
as well as the legal basis for the processing.” (Highlights from authors)
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language privacy policies, such as the necessity for the performance of a contract, compliance
with legal obligations, protection of DS’s vital interests or public interest, and the legitimate
interests of a DC. These legal basis are listed in the GDPR [39, Art. 6], and major stakeholders
generally consider cumulatively either all of them, or a large subset.
Informing about the legal basis is required by the GDPR, and not explicitly by the FIPPs
which requires informing “whether the provision of the requested data is voluntary or required,
and the consequences of a refusal to provide the requested information”. Legal basis information
is not required by CCPA, HIPPA, and COPPA.
DS Rights DS can exercise rights regarding their data, and natural language privacy poli-
cies now often mention the rights to access, rectify, port and erase data, likely due to the influence
of the GDPR. DS rights can be seen more restrictively as possibilities to opt-in or opt-out. Thus
natural language privacy policies present how to subscribe or unsubscribe to specific services.
Informing about DS rights is required by the GDPR, HIPAA and COPPA, but not by the
FIPPs. In CCPA, only the right to opt-out is explicit (other rights are ensured but Californians
do not have to be explicitly informed of them in a privacy policy).
Data Retention Natural language privacy policies often describe the period during which
personal data will be stored. It can be a fixed value — e.g., 30 days after data collection, or
variable — e.g. as long as your account is active. It often comes with the type of data, the
purpose, and the legal basis of processing.
Informing about the retention time is required by the GDPR. COPPA addresses it but do
not make it mandatory to inform about it. FIPPs, CCPA and HIPPA do not require it.
Data Security DC regularly explain in their policies how data is stored, if its communication
is secured or its storage encrypted.
Informing about the security of data is required by the FIPPs, but not by the GDPR although
it mentions that “Personal data should be processed in a manner that ensures appropriate se-
curity and confidentiality of the personal data” [39, Recital 39]. Similarly, COPPA states that
“The operator must establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidential-
ity, security, and integrity of personal information collected from children.” HIPPA requires to
inform of the “entity’s duties to protect privacy”. CCPA does not require to inform of this item.
Policy Changes The modalities of notification in the case of a change in the privacy policy
can also be observed. Notification is usually by email or within the service’s interface, in some
cases notifications are sent by regular mail or by phone. This item is not required by the GDPR,
the FIPPs, CCPA, HIPPA, or COPPA.
Other We subsume the identity and contact of DC, requirements towards specific audiences
such as children, and Do-Not-Track under this item. The DC usually provides its identity, as
well as its contact details if the DS has to lodge a complaint. In many legislations [39, Recitals
38 & 58] [41] children have specific considerations. As a result, many natural language privacy
policies include a dedicated section, even if it is only to mention that personal data of children
under thirteen is not collected without parental consent.
The identity of DC is required by the GDPR, the FIPPs, and HIPAA, but not Do-Not-Track.
As for requirements for children, they are specifically addressed by these legislations. CCPA
requires more specifically to “Make available to consumers two or more designated methods
for submitting requests for information”, and does not address data collected from children.
RR n° 9287
8 V. Morel & R. Pardo
COPPA requires to inform of the identity and contact of DC, and targets data collection related
to children.
3.2 Tools
Several solutions exist to assist in the authoring of natural language privacy policies, offering
different levels of automation. We denote these tools authoring tools. We distinguish templates,
generators, and retrievers. Authoring tools are often tailored to websites and mobile app owners,
and are constrained in terms of content. Furthermore, there exist analysis tools: software able
to parse and analyze natural language privacy policies, in order to produce a machine-readable
or a graphical version of a policy.
Templates and generators Tools such as Docracy [35], Termsfeed [102], SEQ Legal [100],
and 3DCart [3] provide a fill-in-the-gap form, where the author writes appropriate terms in
the fields. We refer to them as templates. These tools guide the authoring process, but do
not provide additional functional such as validation of the input data. It is not possible, for
instance, to check if the email of a service owner is valid. Generators comprise more complex
tools where authors input data only once regarding relevant fields of a privacy policy, and the
tool automatically generate the privacy policy. Most generators do not allow incorrect data:
email addresses without @ are highlighted, and the author cannot go further in the process and
generate the policy. Generators also give the option of expressing the same policy according
to different legal contexts. For instance, privacypolicies.com offers clauses specific to the
GDPR or COPPA. A set of what we denote light generators have a restricted set of parameters,
while another composed of more detailed generators offer a choice between a policy tailored
to websites or mobile applications, with a more exhaustive list of items [62]. Privacy Policy
Generator [82], Privacy Policy Online [32], or GetTerms [46] are examples of the former set, and
PrivacyPolicies.com [84] and FreePrivacyPolicy.com [44] of the latter.
Retrievers Retrievers, such as those offered by Miao [70], Apolinarski et al. [10] and Yu
et al. [113], automatically extract relevant information from code of mobile application using
static code analysis or user behavior analysis. For instance, in [10] the authors analyze sharing
behavior when using online collaboration tools. These prototypes work on Android applications,
in which personal data management is structured around the concept of permissions [47]. These
permissions define the type of data accessible by an application, such as contacts, content of text
messages, or Wi-Fi management. A retriever analyses those permissions, and interprets them
according to well-defined rules to author a natural language privacy policy. In that case, an
author does not necessarily have to input any information in addition to the code: the retriever
can parse the name of the DC, the permission requested by a service or the third-party libraries,
and can convert this information into natural language. However, retrievers are often tailored to
a specific solution — mobile applications in most cases — and could thus be difficult to implement
in other ecosystems. Furthermore, they cannot automatically retrieve certain information, such
as the purpose of collection or the retention time.
Analysis tools Analysis tools have been developed for over a decade. They focused on using
Natural Language Processing or Information Extraction [26] to parse natural language privacy
policies. An early work has been conducted by Brodie et al. [19]. The Usable Privacy Project
lead by Sadeh [93] further investigated the automated classification of privacy policies. Within
this project, Ammar et al. [8] conducted a pilot study for automatic text categorization. The
Usable Privacy Project also developed a website privacy policy corpus [109], which will later be
Inria
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notably used by Polisis [50]. Zimmeck et al. [116] devised a hybrid solution combining machine
learning classifiers (association rules) with crowdsourcing. Analysis tools achieve an accuracy
averaging around 80%, which has not significantly improved since the first attempts.
The content produced by most authoring tools does not have legal value. Those tools do
not provide legal advice, but rather general guidelines for policy authoring. These guidelines
may be sufficient, but their legal validity is not guaranteed and should be verified by a lawyer.
As an example, Iubenda advertises for its “Attorney-level compliance” [54], but advocates for a
professional legal consultancy [55], and do not guarantee conformity with the law, which they
claim “only a lawyer can do”. In other words: DC are responsible for the compliance with the
law. They have to ensure that their privacy policies address all legal requirements, and to enforce
the claims made in their policies.
3.3 Benefits
Legal value Natural language privacy policies are the only type of privacy policies with legal
value as it is the standard format for legal texts. 5 Most legislations require DC to provide a lawful
statement detailing the processing of personal data, and natural language privacy policies often
aim to fulfill this obligation. Lawyers rely on natural language to evaluate whether privacy
policies are correctly drafted: these policies contain all details to determine whether there has
been a violation. Also, lawyers use these policies to check compliance with data protection
regulations. However, a document holding legal value is not necessarily compliant with the law.
For instance, lawyers or DPAs may check that all items required by the legislation are provided
to DS, and auditors can check that data processing is performed according to the policy. Legal
compliance is twofold: with respect to the information requirements, and with respect to the
actual processing.
3.4 Limitations
Ambiguity Natural language privacy policies can be ambiguous [88], as they may be inter-
preted in different ways. Reidenberg et al. [88, 87] presented privacy policies to privacy experts,
law and policy researchers, who were ultimately unable to agree on some aspects of the policies.
They proposed a crowd-sourcing annotation to tackle this issue, but admit that it would only
provide a partial solution. This ambiguity is mainly due to the fact that a statement in natural
language can be interpreted in different ways. Ambiguity has a direct impact on the understand-
ing, the enforcement, and the auditability of privacy policies. Ambiguity is also an explanation
of the inaccuracy of analysis tools described in Section 3.2.
Understanding McDonald and Cranor [68] showed that it would take 200 hours a year for an
average US citizen to read all the natural language privacy policies of the online services she used.
This is clearly impractical, and thinking that DS read privacy policies before using a service is a
fictio juris. All the more, nowadays, it seems highly inconvenient to spend a significant amount
of time before using an online service.
Enforcement & auditability Because they are currently ambiguous, natural language pri-
vacy policies are difficult to enforce: natural language lacks precise semantics, making it difficult
to decide how data must be processed by the underlying system. Likewise, natural language
5It does not however mean than other facets do not have legal value, rather that natural language privacy
policies are mandatory.
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privacy policies can also be hurdles to auditing: it can be difficult for an independent authority
to compare stated and existing processing.
Summary
Natural language privacy policies are the most used medium to express privacy policies, and the
tools used to assist their production can be categorized into templates, generators, and retriev-
ers. These tools are often tailored to specific solutions, such as website or mobile applications,
therefore restricting their scope. Analysis tools are not accurate enough to be trusted blindly.
Natural language privacy policies are necessary for legal compliance, but suffer in practice from
ambiguity and understandability.
4 Graphical privacy policies
In the previous section, we analyzed natural language privacy policies. They are necessary for
legal compliance, but they can mislead DS when they attempt to read them, as they are often
difficult to understand. As a consequence, other representations focused on DS understanding
have been devised: privacy policies can also be expressed with graphical (in the broad sense) rep-
resentations, that we denote graphical privacy policies. Graphical privacy policies cover icons sets
and standardized notices as well as solutions providing additional information, such as warnings
or judgments, sometimes combined with simple text [91]. Note that graphical privacy policies are
rarely specifications, rather additional representations of natural language privacy policies. For
instance, Android Permissions [47] represent privacy policies combining icons and text according
to XML specifications. Graphical privacy policies often come from privacy advocates, but this is
not only the case, notably since the WP29 explicitly mentioned icons as appropriate to convey
privacy notices in their guidelines for transparency [111]. Privacy notices are means to inform
DS, and are often understood as what we denote graphical privacy policies. Therefore, we include
them in our study. We categorize each work based on: i) the elements in the taxonomy presented
in Section 3 that it captures; ii) its features, whether it is made of icons, complementary text,
or variants of those; and iii) the intended audience of the language, e.g., DS or DC. Table 2 in
Section 4.4 summarizes our study.
4.1 Content
Based on their content, graphical privacy policies can be divided into three main types: icons,
standardized notices, and rating solutions. This distinction emerged from an empirical analysis
of the solutions studied, combined with impactful insights such as [28]. Graphical privacy poli-
cies based on icons intend to express the content of privacy policies, for DC and DS policies.
Some of these icons try to cover all the items of the taxonomy introduced in Section 3. Other
graphical privacy policies aim to express the same content as natural language privacy policies,
but in a standardized and often comparable manner. Some graphical privacy policies provide
rating information concerning certain aspects of privacy policies such as the transparency level
or potential risks. These solutions were not devised to meet the same requirements as natural
language privacy policies, the content of these graphical privacy policies in that respect is often
restricted. In the following, we describe the content of graphical privacy policies according to
the elements of the taxonomy and their type.
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Sets of icons
The content of graphical privacy policies reviewed in this section lies in their icons, and sometimes
in the simple explanations that comes with them. As an example, the symbol @ can represent
collection of an email address, and a stylized calendar can represent retention time. But certain
items are harder to express graphically. For instance, describing the legal basis of processing
with the help of icons can easily be mistaken, and can mislead the intended audience instead of
simplifying the understanding.
Usually, sets of icons (see [1, 37]) do not sufficiently express the items presented in the
taxonomy. Instead, they express specific items. A solution such as Privicons [63] focuses on
informing mail correspondents of how the data should be handled instead. Other solutions such
as [92] include icons for selling, and second-use of data, but the type of data cannot be specified.
Recently, Rossi and Palmirani [90] proposed a Data Protection icon set, named DaPIS. The
interesting features of their approach is that they based the icon set on an ontology named
PrOnto, and they tested their set in order to refine it. Moreover, it stands out by emphasizing
items recently introduced in the legislations, such as DS rights or legal bases for processing.
However, it does not consider the type of data.
Many privacy advocates also contributed to this area and provided numerous sets of icons
(see [4, 86]). For instance, Mehldau [69] developed a set of 30 privacy icons describing the type of
data, third-parties, the purpose of processing and the retention time. Recently, a set of privacy
icons was designed by Privacy Tech [83]. This set considers many types of data, as well as
advanced representations of sharing, such as adequacy transfer (see Figure 1).
(a) UE transfer
adequacy
(b) Connection data
(c) One year
conservation
(d) Audience
measurement
Figure 1: Excerpt of the Privacy Tech icons
Another notable example of privacy icons are the android permissions [47], created by Google.
They present icons combined with simple natural language. For each application installed on a
mobile phone running Android, the permission manager presents a short graphical policy. Only
little information is presented (the type of data collected, and processing in recent versions, but
not the purpose for instance), and DS have to look into the natural language privacy policy in
order to find more information.
Standardized notices
Another line of work considers the content described by the taxonomy as standardized notices.
These standardized notices are often represented in tables [60], but the key concept is the common
vocabulary among notices. Kelley et al. [60] represent policies in a table such as nutrition labels
observed on food packaging. They present the fine-grained information in a table such as nutrition
labels observed on food packaging. Polisis by Harkous et al. [50] can represent the natural
language privacy policies as a combination of icons, highlights of the corresponding paragraphs
in the natural language privacy policies, and a flow diagram (see Figure 2). Because Polisis relies
on supervised machine-learning, i.e., on a labeled corpus, it classifies natural language privacy
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policies in a standardized way. Such summarization has been accomplished by PrivacyCheck as
well [114].
Figure 2: Example of a flow diagram in Polisis
Emami-Naeini et al. [38] conduct a survey in order to rank the factors of IoT devices purchase.
They determine that security and privacy were among the most important factors of purchase,
and consequently developed an IoT privacy label to improve information visualization. Cranor
analyzes the impact of the development of standardized mechanisms of notice and choice in [28],
and more specifically the efforts conducted around P3P. Cranor reconsiders the advances made
in standardization, 6 as well as the limitations, lack of adoption and enforcement.
Rating solutions
Certain graphical privacy policies do not focus on expressing the items in our taxonomy, but
present extra information related to privacy policies [108, 99, 49], often a judgment of the risk
level associated to a DC policy, or a comparison between DS and DS policies. We denote them
rating solutions.
Privacy Bird [29] is one of the first rating solution. It consists of a colored bird, where the
color indicates the matching (green for a match between the DS policy and the website’s DC
policy, red for conflict, yellow for uncertain, gray when disabled) (see Figure 3).
(a) Matching policies (b) Conflicting policies (c) Uncertain decision (d) Add-on disabled
Figure 3: Privacy Bird
6Note that icons are considered as part of standardization efforts in [28].
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It is represented as an add-on for Internet Explorer, restricted to Microsoft Windows. A
dedicated website [29] provides an explanatory tour as well as a feature named privacy finder :
Privacy Bird is then used as an indicator when browsing the web [20, 28]. Privacy finder displays
the search results of a search engine, combined with the analysis of Privacy Bird. The bird
was placed alongside search results, and was influential in the choice of shopping websites [103],
notably when the items being purchased were likely to have privacy concerns [36]. DS could rank
the results according to the matching between their DS policy and the websites’ DC policies.
In [75], Pardo & Le Me´tayer present a web interface to inform DS about the potential risks of
their privacy policies. The interface is composed of a user-friendly form for DS to input their
privacy policies and a set of risk analysis questions, e.g., “Can company X collect my data?”.
Additionally, DS may introduce risk assumptions in order to specify possible misbehaviors that
the collecting parties can perform. In Section 5, we describe in detail the underlying privacy
language and the automatic risk analysis. The ToS;DR initiative helps DS understanding the
risks associated to a DC policy [101]. It started in 2011 during the Chaos Communication Camp.
ToS;DR comprises not only icons, but also results from crowdsource analyses in simple language.
The idea of the project is to assess the data practices of web services by giving them badges,
awarded by the project’s community. Once a service has enough badges to assess the level of
protection of their terms for users, a class is automatically assigned by pondering the average
scores.
4.2 Tools
Tools for representing graphical privacy policies are tailored to the web, and are often found as
add-ons for web browsers.
Privacy Bird is represented as an add-on for Internet Explorer, restricted to Microsoft Win-
dows. ToS;DR is also an add-on, for both Firefox and Chrome, as it ranks policies based on
crowdsourced analyses by a community directly within the web browser. A website has been built
to present Polisis [80], and add-ons for Chrome [78] and Firefox [79] are available (the add-ons
redirect to the corresponding part of the website). The add-on ”Disconnect Privacy Icons“ [34],
in collaboration with TRUSTe, which evolved from Raskin’s set of icons for Mozilla [86], provided
an interactive and comprehensive view of privacy policies within the browser. The add-on would
display icons according to a website privacy policy if the website complies with the solution.
All of these tools focus on the web, whereas the IoT is left unchallenged in that respect.
4.3 Benefits
Graphical privacy policies cannot be seen as legal commitments because they lack precise mean-
ing, but they have other benefits: they can foster understanding.
Designed for lay-user understandability Many solutions coming from privacy advocates
(e.g., [69, 86, 4, 85]) aim to provide intelligible information to lay-users. These solutions were
built with the will to popularize natural language privacy policies, and were designed to be un-
derstood quickly and take simplicity account. It is also the case for academic solutions such as
the privacy labels [60], which “allows participants to find information more quickly and accu-
rately”. Based on the principle that existing natural language privacy policies do not convey
intelligible information about data collection and processing, Kelley et al. strove to provide a
universal solution. Graphical privacy policies can also convey intelligible notices for scientists
and physicians using sensitive datasets, such as the DataTags [99, 15]. Their solution includes
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a simplified interface for access requirement to medical data, as this type of data is mostly
restricted to medical practitioners and researchers.
Attempts were made to analyze what icons were recognizable and to measure their reliability.
Egelman et al. [37] crowdsourced privacy indicators for the IoT. In their study, they found
out that some icons are well-recognized (e.g., the camera symbol was recognized by more than
95% of participants as representing video recording), while others are not (only 3.6% recognized
the voice command & control icon). Kelley et al. [61] conducted a user study, to refine their
privacy label. They compared the accuracy of information retrieval between their proposition
and natural language privacy policies in natural language. As a result, they purposely combined
simple natural language to prevent confusion, notably for the terms opt-in and opt-out. 7 A
promising attempt to measure understandability has been conducted in [90]. They performed
three evaluations of their icon set in order to improve the recognition of icons. However, they
regret the lack of diversity in the participants’ panel, notably for the educational level.
4.4 Limitations
Ambiguity Though accessible to and often designed for lay-users, graphical privacy policies
may be interpreted in different ways, thus leading to ambiguities (see Section 4.1). The same
icon can be interpreted in different ways according to the differences in culture, education level,
or context etc. For instance, a euro symbol ¤ can represent the commercial use of collected
data, or that DS will be paid for having her data collected. Little has been done to produce a
reasonably recognized set of icons for privacy — e.g. validated by a user study — despite the
attempts of [37] and [1, Chapter 15] to see what were the most recognizable icons, and of [61] to
provide a graphical policy where results could be found accurately. The three stages evaluation
of Rossi and Palmirani [90] however leads the path to less ambiguous graphical privacy policies.
Incompleteness Graphical privacy policies are limited by their restricted scope. As seen in
Section 4.1, existing graphical privacy policies are not as expressive as natural language privacy
policies, due to the limited number of icons available. Some aspects are rarely mentioned, others
only in complementary text and not in the graphical part of the policy. One aspect in particular
is never mentioned in graphical privacy policies (policy change), and another is considered in
only one work (legal basis).
Claim over legal compliance Some graphical privacy policies, such as cookie consent notices,
have been used to claim legal compliance to retrieve consent. Degeling et al. [31] observed that
a significant part (16%) of websites added cookie consent notices after the GDPR, but these
notices do not always comply with transparency requirements according to Utz et al. [106] as
they tend to use Dark Patterns [48] to lure DS into giving their consent.
Summary
Graphical privacy policies are promising for conveying summarized versions of natural language
privacy policies, and they can rely on user-friendly tools to be adopted. However, they should
come with explanations to ensure human understanding and mitigate their restricted content.
See Table 2 for a visual and global overview of our study on graphical policies.
7Note that they also test the speed of retrieval, as well as comparisons between DC policies in addition to
information retrieval.
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Privacy Bird [29] X X X X — — — — — —
Rundle [92] X X X G# #  # G# #
Mehldau [69] X X  G# #   #
Privacy Commons [4] X X G# G# # # # #
Privacy Nutrition Label [60] X X X  G# # # # #
Primelife [1, Chapter 15] X X — — — — — #
Raskin [86] X X G# G# #  # #
Privicons [63] X X # G# # # # #
Privacy wheel [108] X X X # G# # # G# #
Android permissions [47] X X X G# # # # # #
“Is this thing on?”[37] X X G# # # # # #
Datatags [15] X X X # # # #  #
Hagan [49] X X X G# G# G# G# # #
Polisis [50] X X X X  a  a  a  a  a #
Privacy Tech [83] X X  G# #  G# #
DaPIS [90] X X G# G#  # #  
IoT label [38] X X X   #   #
ToS DR [101] X X X  a  a  a G#a G#a #
Features Type Content
Table 2: Categorization of graphical privacy policies. We use the subscript a to denote that
a solution extensively uses natural language besides graphical representations. The column
indicates: Features, whether the solution is made of icons or provides ratings about policies, and
whether it provides explanation in simple natural language; Type (Type of policy), whether the
solution expresses a DC or a DS policy; Content, whether the solution can express the different
items enumerated in Section 3. We use  to denote that the solution can express most or all
values; G# to denote that the solution expresses few values of the items, and is mostly insufficient;# to denote that the solution cannot express the item; and “—” to denote that the material does
not permit judging whether the solution can express this item or not. Note that some items of
the taxonomy are omitted since no solution includes them.
5 Machine-readable privacy policies
Many efforts have been devoted to the expression of machine-readable privacy policies — i.e.,
privacy policies that can be automatically processed by computers. Most of these efforts were
made by academics, and result in what has been called privacy languages. According to Kasem
et al. [59], a privacy language is “a set of syntax and semantics that is used to express policies”.
Many privacy languages have been proposed in the past twenty years [59, 107]. We review here the
different ways in which privacy languages are used to express machine-readable privacy policies.
In particular, we categorize each work based on: i) the elements in the taxonomy presented in
Section 3 that it captures; ii) the type of enforcement mechanism it uses and whether it has been
implemented; iii) additional tools for policy analysis or comparison; iv) the intended audience
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of the language, DS or DC; and v) whether it is intended to be used by lay-users. Table 3
summarizes our study.
5.1 Content
Here we describe the content that machine-readable privacy policies include. This content is
determined by the syntax of the privacy language. Many languages are defined using machine-
readable formats such as XML so that they can be automatically processed by machines. Other
languages, however, are based on mathematical definitions (e.g., logical languages), thus enabling
the possibility of reasoning about them — these languages can easily be expressed in machine-
readable formats due to the lack of ambiguity. Another important factor is the target audience
of a language, i.e., DC, DS or both. In what follows, we describe the content of machine-readable
languages (according to the items defined in Section 3), the format used to express the policies
and their target audience.
Access control languages such as XACML [9] and RBAC [94] have been among the first
languages used for the specification of machine-readable privacy policies. Typically, these policies
include the datatype to which they apply, and the set of entities with access privileges. Some
extensions such as GeoXACML [66] include conditions depending on geolocation information.
Usage control (UCON) [76, 81] extends access control with the notion of obligations, i.e., actions
to be executed after data has been received — e.g., “do not transfer data item i to Service
X” or “remove data on 25/05/2018”. These obligations make it possible to express items such
as retention time, purpose and allowed data transfers. The Obligation Specification Language
(OSL) [51] is a fully-fledged UCON language. OSL leverages Digital Right Management systems
(DRMs) [42] to enforce the obligations in UCON policies. Both access control and UCON are
used by DC to define their policies, and do not offer mechanisms for DS to express their policies.
Several languages focused on expressing privacy policies have been developed. One of the
first is the “Platform for Privacy Preferences” (P3P) [27]. P3P appeared as a policy language
for the web. P3P policies are specified in XML format, and include: purpose, retention time,
and conditions. Conditions may be opt-in and/or opt-out choices for DS, or preferences based
on enterprise data — e.g., DS’s credit or service usage. Many extensions to P3P have been
proposed [64, 11, 7] — for instance, E-P3P [11] extends P3P with obligations a` la UCON. After
P3P, new languages with similar syntax have been proposed: “Enterprise Policy Authorization
Language” (EPAL) [12], “An Accountability Policy Language” (A-PPL) [13], “Customer Profile
Exchange” (CPExchange) [18], “Privacy Rights Markup Language” (PRML) [115], “Purpose-to-
Use” (P2U) [56] and “Layered Privacy Language” (LPL) [45]. These languages are similar than
P3P in terms of content, but bring numerous enhancements in terms of usability and enforcement
(see Section 5.2).
Formal privacy languages (formal languages in the following) comprise a different approach
to express privacy policies. CI [73], PrivacyAPIs [67], SIMPL [65], PrivacyLFP [33], S4P [17],
QPDL [107], and PILOT [75] are languages that have their syntax and semantics defined math-
ematically. More precisely, they use formal languages such as Linear Temporal Logic [53], First-
Order Logic [53] or Authorization Logic [5]. However, not all of these formal languages have the
same focus. S4P, SIMPL and PILOT are focused on expressing DS and DC policies. Similarly
to the languages above, it is possible to express types of data, conditions, purpose, retention
time and allowed data transfers. Conditions are often more sophisticated than that of the pre-
vious languages as they are based on logical languages. On the other hand, CI, PrivacyAPIs
and PrivacyLFP focus on encoding privacy regulations such as HIPAA [104], COPPA [41] or
GLBA [105]. As a consequence, their expressive power is greater than languages focusing on
DS and DC policies. They include temporal operators that make it possible to express policies
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about past and future events. For example, Barth et al. [16] express the following statement from
COPPA “[...] an infant can only send identifiable information to a website, if her parent have
previously sent their consent for data collection”. QPDL is a meta-language to reason about
privacy languages. While privacy policies can be expressed in QPDL, it is not its intended use
— it was designed to formally reason about policy languages. Jeeves [112] is a programming
language with built-in support for a limited form of privacy policies. It allows programmers to
specify confidentiality conditions based on the execution context. For instance, in a double-blind
conference management system, only organizers can see paper authors until the review process
is completed.
5.2 Tools
In this section, we describe the mechanisms used to enforce machine-readable privacy policies,
and existing tools to compare and perform analyses on policies for instance.
Formal Semantics Formal languages give meaning to their privacy policies by means of formal
semantics. Typically, these semantics define what events may be executed depending on the
privacy policies selected by the actors interacting in the system. SIMPL, PILOT, S4P and CI
use trace semantics, i.e., they define the sequences of events (traces) that respect the privacy
policies of DS and DC. Jeeves has its semantics formalized using lambda calculus [23]. Rei
semantics is defined in Prolog [24]. Though precise and unambiguous, there is a gap between the
definition of formal semantics and the real implementation. Nevertheless, this gap may be very
small, e.g., Jeeves lambda calculus semantics were implemented as a Scala library, Rei’s semantics
are encoded in Prolog, and PILOT semantics are implemented as a Promela model [52].
Informal Semantics Access control, UCON and privacy dedicated languages have their en-
forcement mechanisms specified as W3C specifications, specification languages such as UML, or
they are simply implemented using a general purpose programming language. All these languages
use request evaluation engines to enforce privacy policies. Request evaluation engines take a data
request and evaluate whether the requester may access the data based on the privacy policies.
The content of data requests depends on the language. For instance, in RBAC, data requests
contain type of data and the role of the requester. If the role of the requester matches one of the
roles allowed by the policy associated with the data, then data can be accessed. Most languages
do not have mechanisms to enforce that data will be used according to the policies after being
collected — e.g., checking that data is deleted before the retention time — but there are some
exceptions. LPL erases automatically data from the central repository after the retention time
has elapsed. UCON-based languages use DRM to enforce obligations.
Policy comparison For some languages, algorithms have been devised to automatically com-
pare policies. The goal is to determine, given two policies, which one is more restrictive. For
example, a policy that allows data processing for research purposes during 7 days is more restric-
tive than a policy that allows data processing for advertisement and research during 90 days.
Policy comparison is necessary to mechanize consent management. If a DC policy is more restric-
tive than a DS policy, then DS privacy preferences are satisfied. EPAL, P3P and PILOT include
algorithms and tools to compare policies. CI, SIMPL and S4P follow a different approach. They
define how restrictive a policy is, based on its semantics. 8 Languages that do not distinguish
8Using trace semantics it is possible to compare policies based on the set of traces satisfying the policy. The
less traces a policy satisfies, the more restrictive it is.
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DS and DC policies — such as RBAC, A-PPL, or OSL — do not have algorithms to compare
policies. This is not surprising, their goal is to enforce a policy typically defined by DC or system
administrators.
Analysis tools Formal languages often come with tools to perform different types of automatic
analyses. PILOT uses model-checking [14] to perform risk analysis. Given a DS policy and a set
of risk assumptions, such as “Company X may transfer data to Company Y”, it is possible to
automatically answer questions such as “Can Company Z use my data for advertisement?”. Rei
comes with a Prolog interface where queries such as the above can be asked. PrivacyAPIs also
uses model-checking to automatically verify properties about the privacy regulation HIPAA. It
can, for instance, be used to determine who can access patients medical files depending on their
content or role.
5.3 Benefits
Machine-readable privacy policies have four main benefits: 1) they can be automatically enforced;
2) they can be audited; 3) it is possible to reason about their correctness; and 4) they make it
possible to automate certain procedures. In what follows we explain each of these benefits in
detail.
Enforcement As opposed to natural language or graphical policies, machine-readable policies
can be automatically enforced. As described in Section 5.2, all policy languages have the means to
guarantee that data is accessed according to the policies. Languages based on request evaluation
are easier to implement (cf Section 5.2), and are consequently more widespread. Typically, every
party holding personal data must implement a part of the request evaluation engine. In general,
the implementation of formal languages is more complicated. They require tracking actions
applied to the data, or inferring what are the purposes for which data is used — as opposed to
simply control access to data.
Auditability Machine-readable privacy policies make it possible to audit whether data is being
handled according to the privacy policies. This functionality is of great value for DPAs. Auditing
mechanisms are typically implemented as logs recording the operations performed on sensitive
data. For instance, EPAL requires to create an audit trail of access to keep track of whom
has accessed personal data. In A-PPL, on the other hand, it is possible to specify auditable
operations such as read or delete, and the enforcement records in a log every time that such
operations occur.
Correctness The lack of ambiguity in policy languages makes it possible to precisely reason
about their correctness, i.e., that data is handled as stated in the privacy policies. This is
specially true for formal languages. Their semantics can be used to formally prove certain
correctness properties. For example, S4P, SIMPL and PILOT have been used to prove global
properties such as “data is never used after its retention time”, or, “data is always used according
to DS policies”. Moreover, languages focused on modeling privacy regulation — CI, PrivacyAPIs
and PrivacyLFP — can be used to find inconsistencies in the regulation (if any). For example,
it was possible using PrivacyAPIs to find unexpected ambiguities in HIPPAA.9 It is important
to remark that there exists a gap between the formal semantics and its implementation —
technical details not modeled in the semantics may lead to unforeseen violation of the properties.
9These ambiguities were also found by commenters four years after it was enacted [67].
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Therefore, formal languages should include auditing mechanisms, as the languages mentioned in
the previous paragraph.
Automation Machine-readable privacy policies allow for automating procedures such as pol-
icy communication and consent management. Automatic policy communication facilitates trans-
parency by boosting DS awareness about how their data is being handled — notably in ubiquitous
systems where passive data collection is the norm [30]. Automatic consent management can em-
power DS if managed in a protective way — e.g., by mitigating the burden of choice [98] — and
facilitate the retrieving of an informed consent for DC. Cunche et al. [71] devise a generic frame-
work to manage informed consent in the IoT, using DS and DC policies based on PILOT [75].
Automatic communication of privacy policies also makes possible a negotiation of privacy choices:
DC and DS can interact more quickly by means of machines.
5.4 Limitations
The main limitations of machine-readable privacy policies are their lack of adoption and usability.
As adoption relies among other things on human-understandability, understandable and usable
policies seems to be a condition sine qua non for their adoption.
Human understandability One of the most recurring criticism of machine-readable privacy
policies is their lack of human understandability. Only a handful of languages such as SIMPL,
LPL or PILOT take it into account: they include a natural language version of each policy.
It is however questionable whether they can actually be understood. To put things into per-
spective, the OECD [74] conducted a study showing that two third of adults from developed
countries cannot conduct a medium-difficulty task related to ICT environments. Although pri-
vacy management was not mentioned in the study, it is a medium-difficulty task, and solutions
tackling privacy management must consider information-illiteracy. Machine-readable privacy
policies should be expressed in languages close to natural language in order to be understood, or
be complemented by friendly interfaces.
Lack of adoption Another pitfall for machine-readable privacy policies is their lack of adop-
tion. It is arguably a consequence of poor human understandability. Most of the work done on
privacy languages had few or no impact, apart from P3P. With the other solutions stemming
from it (APPEL, E-P3P, . . . ) and the extension Privacy Bird for Internet Explorer, P3P ob-
tained recognition out of the academic scope. It has been an official set of specifications of the
W3C supported by the web browser Internet Explorer. Note that other languages were published
as specifications by companies [18, 9] and can therefore be considered as having had some recog-
nition. On the other hand, most formal languages lack a practical and scalable implementation,
making it difficult to use them in practice. Usability, implementation and widespread recognition
are a rare combination in privacy languages.
Summary
Machine-readable privacy policies can provide means to express unambiguous privacy policies,
and can be enforced as well as audited by authorities. However, they are often unintelligible
for lay-users, which results in a lack of adoption. We provide a visual and global overview of
machine-readable policies in Table 3.
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P3P [27] XML Informal 3 Comparison 3 3 G# #  # # # G#
CPExchange [18] XML Informal 3 # #  # # G#  
PRML [115] 3 XML Informal 3 # #  G# # G# G#
APPEL [64] 3 XML Informal 3 3 3 G# #  # # # G#
E-P3P [11] XML Formal 3 3 G# # G# G# # G# G#
Rei [58] Formal Formal Analysis 3 G# G# G# G# # # G#
Xpref [7] 3 XML Informal 3 3 G# #  # # # G#
XACML [9] XML Informal 3 3 # # G# # # # #
EPAL [12] XML Informal 3 Comparison 3 # #  G# # # G#
CI [16] Formal Formal 3 3 G# G# G#  G# # #
SIMPL [65] 3 Formal Formal 3 3 G# #    G#  
S4P [17] 3 Formal Formal 3 3 G# #   # # G#
Jeeves [112] Formal Formal 3 3 G# # G# G# # G# #
P2U [56] 3 XML Informal 3 # #   # #  
QPDL [107] Formal Formal 3 3 G#    G#  #
RBAC [94] XML Informal 3 3 # # G# # # # #
OSL [51] Formal Formal 3 3 G# #   #   
GeoXACML [66] XML Informal 3 3 #  G# G# # # #
A-PPL [13] XML Informal 3 # G#   G# G# G#
LPL [45] 3 XML Informal 3 3 3 # #   # G#  
PrivacyAPIs [67] Formal Formal Analysis 3 3 G# #      
PrivacyLFP [33] Formal Formal 3 3 G# #      
PILOT [75] 3 Formal Formal Analysis 3 3     G# #  
Features Audience Conditions Content
Table 3: Categorization of privacy languages. The columns indicate: Usability, whether the
language is intended to be understood by DS; Syntax, whether the syntax of the language defined
in XML or a formal language; Enforcement, whether the language has a formally or informally
defined enforcement; Implemented, whether the language has been implemented; Tools, the type
of available tools for the language; Audience, whether the language can describe a DS or a DC
policy; Conditions, whether the language supports conditional rules describing when and/or
where data may be collected; Content, whether the language can express the items described
in Section 3.1. We use  to denote that the item is explicitly included in the language; G# to
denote that the item is partially supported; and # the item is not present in the language and
cannot be encoded. Some items of the taxonomy are omitted since no solution includes them.
6 Insights
In this section, we provide several insights that we identified as a result of our study.10 We show
that each facet is tailored to a specific audience, and that this is both 1) what makes it beneficial,
but also 2) an obstacle to the compliance with all the requirements stated in Section 1 (i.e., legal
validity, understandability by all parties, and enforceability through auditable mechanisms). In
Section 6.1, we discuss why a single facet cannot comply with every requirement. In Section 6.2,
we put in perspective the works which attempt to overcome the limitations of mono-faceted
solutions, and provide guidelines for designing privacy policies that aim to cover the three facets.
Finally, in Section 6.3, we discuss the coverage of the items in our taxonomy by privacy policies
10We refer the reader to Table 4 in Appendix A for an overview of the juxtaposition of the results combining
all facets.
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in each facet.
6.1 Limitations of mono-faceted solutions
A single facet cannot cover all the requirements of privacy policies. This is due to the tension
between: i) the suitability for lawyers, ii) the suitability for lay-users, and iii) the automatic
enforcement by machines. Concretely, there are details that only have meaning in one facet
and are irrelevant in others. Details specific to natural language privacy policies are used by
lawyers to check that the policy complies with privacy protection regulations — such as the
GDPR. In general, lay-users may not have the knowledge to fully understand these details, which
makes it less accessible for them. Likewise, natural language privacy policies do not include low
level details related to the enforcement of the policies by a machine — those details are often
unnecessary for law enforcement and require lawyers to be familiar with those technicalities.
Graphical privacy policies have the objective of being understood by a general audience, but this
form of privacy policies have no use for lawyers or enforcement by machines. Machine-readable
privacy policies aim at being enforced by machines. They are written in a machine-readable
format, and they include all the necessary details for the underlying system to enforce them.
These details make them difficult to understand by humans, and are, consequently, unsuitable
for lawyers and lay-users.
Illustrative example Consider the icon from Privacy Tech Icons (see Section 4) that
denotes that data is deleted after 1 year, and this excerpt of Facebook’s privacy policy: “[...]
when you search for something on Facebook, you can access and delete that query from within
your search history at any time, but the log of that search is deleted after six months.” Facebook’s
policy is more precise than the icon: it refers to concrete data which is produced after a certain
user action. However, these details may not be of prime interest for some lay-users, at least in a
first stage. For instance, they may not know what a log entry or a query are. Hence, this level
of detail may be counter-productive for lay-users. Yet, this information is required to determine
whether Facebook is processing data according to the policy. Thus, it cannot be omitted for
legal purposes or for users who may be interested in more detailed information. Consider also
an excerpt of the policy in APPEL-P3P: <retention-time days=182 xmlns=".../P3P/retention-
time/"/>. This policy includes details that are not present in the natural language policy above:
The format of the policy, XML; the parameter xmlns, required so that the computer can retrieve
the set of possible values for the element in the policy (the XML namespace); and the fact that
retention time must be specified in days. These details are often irrelevant for law enforcement,
and make the policy difficult to understand for lawyers and lay-users.
6.2 Multi-faceted privacy policies
In many cases, limitations in one facet can be addressed by other facets. For instance, nat-
ural language privacy policies may use graphical privacy policies to enhance readability, and
machine-readable privacy policies to be automatically enforced. In this section, we study multi-
faceted privacy policies, i.e., policies that combine any of the three facets studied in this paper:
natural language, graphical, and machine-readable. We present existing works on multi-faceted
privacy policies, discuss challenges in defining them, and provide guidelines on addressing those
challenges.
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Figure 4: Works on multi-faceted privacy policies grouped by combination of facets.
Existing works on multi-faceted privacy policies.
Several initiatives are already proposing multi-faceted solutions. Harkous et al. [50] combine
natural language and graphical privacy policies, bringing together the accessibility of icons and
simple text with the legal value of a natural language privacy policy. Similarly, [108, 6] follow a
layered approach to combining graphical and natural language policies. Users are first presented
with a graphical or simplified version of the policy, which can be refined in several steps all the
way to the legal notice. SIMPL [65], PILOT [75] and LPL [45] combine natural language and
machine-readable privacy policies. They provide an enforceable policy that helps DS to better
understand their choices and provide informed consent — as required by the GDPR. Similarly,
[60, 90] add graphical representations for P3P policies, resulting in intelligible and enforceable
privacy policies.
Figure 4 summarizes the landscape of work on multi-faceted policies. Note that existing
solutions combine at most two types of privacy policies, and their number is small. Notably,
no existing solution encompasses the requirements for legal compliance, understandability, and
enforceability.
Guidelines and challenges
Here we set guidelines and discuss challenges in designing multi-faceted privacy policies, ideally
covering all three facets. We describe two approaches: unified and compound.
Unified In a unified approach, a core facet is defined and the remaining facets are generated
from the core using a policy generator. Natural language is a suitable candidate as core facet
— it is a legal requirement and cannot be omitted. Machine-readable privacy policies could also
be considered as core facet as natural language could automatically be generated from them.
Graphical representations are not suitable for this purpose; they lack the precision required
to generate natural language or machine-readable privacy policies. The main challenge of this
approach is ensuring the soundness of the generated policies. Existing solutions compromise the
expressiveness of a facet to generate policies in other facets. For example, SIMPL uses constrained
natural language so that privacy policies can be enforced by a machine. As mentioned above,
each facet has details that are not addressed by other facets (see Section 6.1). Thus, another
requirement for a policy generator is to include the details specific to the facets generated,
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Graphical Policies Machine-Readable Policies Required by Legislations
 G# #  G# #  G# #
1st party 33% 33% 34% 69% 31% 0% 80% 20% 0%
3rd party 17% 50% 33% 47% 26% 27% 60% 40% 0%
Legal basis 5% 0% 95% 0% 0% 100% 20% 20% 60%
DS Rights 22% 5% 73% 13% 17% 70% 60% 20% 20%
Data Retention 28% 11% 61% 30% 43% 27% 20% 20% 60%
Data Security 22% 22% 56% 17% 30% 53% 40% 40% 20%
Policy Change 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 20% 80%
Figure 5: Coverage of taxonomy items by different types of privacy policies, and the privacy
legislations in Table 1.
although absent in the core facet. To sum up, the challenge for a unified approach is to ensure
that the facets generated from the core keep what makes them beneficial and preserve the meaning
of the core facet.
Compound The compound approach consists in taking mono-faceted policies and using them
together. For instance, we could use legal text, icons from DaPIS, and P3P. Most existing solu-
tions work this way. Unlike the unified approach, the facets in the compound approach include
the specific details of each facet — insofar that it combines existing mono-faceted solutions. The
main challenge here is ensuring consistency between the different facets, e.g., does the machine-
readable facet accurately represents the legal text? Currently, consistency is manually checked by
designers as it is a very difficult task to automate. Tool support and strict guidelines may system-
atize this process and reduce errors. The machine-readable facet is suitable for full automation,
but we argue that the natural language and graphical facets require expert supervision (lawyers
and designers, respectively). In a nutshell, the main challenge is to devise methods ensuring
consistency between the different facets.
6.3 Missing taxonomy items
As we saw in the previous sections, not all items of our taxonomy are covered by existing
solutions. Here we quantify the coverage of each item by the solutions we have studied. The aim
of this section is to shed light on “forgotten” items, and hopefully guide future research on these
directions.
Figure 5 summarizes our results. Each cell of the heat map shows the percentage of the
studied works (in a given facet) that cover completely ( ), partially (G#) or neither (#) an
item of the taxonomy. For instance, the item 1st party is completely covered by 69% of policy
languages (forth column, first row in Figure 5).
The 1st and 3rd party taxonomy items have the best coverage in our study. Probably due
to the fact that they express the most relevant information regarding data collection and pro-
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cessing for DS. These items are followed (in terms of coverage) by Data Retention and Data
Security, which are absent from almost 50% of the languages studied — except for Data Reten-
tion in machine-readable privacy policies. DS Rights is absent in around 70% of the graphical
and machine-readable policy languages. Most likely, because they refer to information difficult
to express graphically, and they are outside the realm of what machine-readable language are
designed for. Finally, legal basis and policy change are absent from all the studied work. Possibly
due to their absence in most legislations; 60% and 80% respectively.
7 Final discussion
Related work This work is not the first to propose an overview of the different manners
to express privacy policies. Schaub et al. [95] present the requirements and best practices for
presenting privacy notices. Their work focuses on providing users impactful notices. In other
words, they study how well they understand the messages conveyed by the privacy notices.
Cranor [28] describes the notice and choice mechanisms, what P3P attempted to do to palliate
issues raised by these principles, and why it failed in doing so. These solutions focus on the design
of privacy policies to enhance usability for lay-users. In our work, we focus on connections of the
graphical and machine-readable privacy policies with legal requirements (i.e., natural language
privacy policies). Although both of these articles consider the machine-readibility of privacy
notices, we highlight benefits that they did not consider, such as the possibility it offers for
enforcement, auditing or automatic consent management.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to systematically study privacy policies
based on the different means of expression or “facets”, and how these facets must be combined
to provide legally valid, usable and enforceable privacy policies.
Conclusion In this paper, we have studied the different ways to express privacy policies: in
natural language, with graphical representations, and using machine-readable means. We have
categorized the existing work in each facet according to a taxonomy of privacy policies, as well as
their specific features. Additionally, we have studied the benefits and limitations of each facet,
and we have shown that the limitations of one facet can be addressed by the benefits of the
other facets. We have studied the combination of different facets, which overcomes limitations
by bringing together the benefits of each facet, and provided guidelines to design multi-faceted
privacy policies. We have made explicit the degree of coverage of the items in our taxonomy
by the surveyed work, thus shedding light on future research directions on the design of mono-
and multi-faceted privacy policies. We envision this work as an effort to facilitate and boost
collaborative work between the legal domain, design, and computer science, and to provide a big
picture of how transparency can be ensured through privacy policies.
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A Appendix
Table 4 provides a condensed overview of the content, benefits, limitations and tools that we have
studied for each facet. The content columns are a coarsed grained presentation of the results in
Figure 5. The three last columns list the benefits, limitations and tools of each facet.
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Natural Language 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 - Legal value - Ambiguity - Templates
- Understandability - Generators
- Enforceability - Retrievers
- Analysis tools
Graphical 3 3 3 3 3 - Understandability - Ambiguity - DS Notification
- Incompleteness - Visual comparison
Machine Readable 3 3 3 3 - Enforcement - Understandability - Enforcement engines
- Auditability - Lack of adoption - Formal Semantics
- Correctness - Policy comparison
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Table 4: Summary of each facet’s content, benefits, limitations and tools. The 3symbol indicates
that at least one work on the corresponding facet captures the taxonomy item.
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